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Abstract 
If an eyewitness is exposed to a co-witness statement that incorrectly blames an innocent bystander 
for a crime, the eyewitness can be influenced by this statement and also blame the innocent 
bystander for the crime. This effect is known as blame conformity. In two studies, we examined 
whether or not this effect is influenced by the degree of confidence a co-witness expresses in her 
incorrect statement (Study 1) and an eyewitness’s own level of self-confidence (Study 2). 
Participant eyewitnesses first watched a crime video featuring a perpetrator and an innocent 
bystander, then read a co-witness statement about the crime that either correctly blamed the 
perpetrator, incorrectly blamed the innocent bystander, or blamed nobody (a control condition). 
They were then asked who committed the crime. In Study 1, participants who read an incorrect 
statement were at increased risk of engaging in blame conformity when the co-witness expressed a 
high level of confidence, compared to a low level of confidence, in the accuracy of her statement. In 
Study 2, participants who were lowest in self-confidence were at increased risk of engaging in 
blame conformity. The theoretical underpinnings of these effects are considered. 
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Eyewitness susceptibility to co-witness misinformation is influenced by  
co-witness confidence and own self-confidence 
Borchard (1932), Garrett (2011), and Porter (2007) document hundreds of legal cases where 
individuals have been accused, tried, convicted, imprisoned, and sometimes executed, for crimes 
they did not commit. When DNA evidence was introduced into the criminal justice system in 1986, 
it offered appeal courts a means of testing the veracity of past convictions (Williams & Johnson, 
2013). To date, there have been 336 DNA exonerations in the United States. In 70% of these cases 
the exonerated were convicted, at least in part, as a result of mistaken eyewitness identification 
(Innocence Project, 2015). A large literature exists examining the reasons why mistaken 
identifications occur (see Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Cling, 2012). Within this literature it has been 
found that eyewitnesses can spontaneously mistakenly identify an innocent bystander as the 
perpetrator of a crime (e.g., Buckhout, 1974). It has also been demonstrated that eyewitnesses are at 
increased risk of blaming an innocent bystander for a crime after exposure to a co-witness statement 
that incorrectly suggests this person was the perpetrator (Thorley, 2015). Here, we present two 
studies that examine whether or not this effect is influenced by the degree of confidence a co-
witness expresses in her belief that an innocent bystander was the perpetrator of a crime (Study 1) 
and an eyewitness’s own level of self-confidence (Study 2). 
Memory conformity and blame conformity 
If eyewitnesses encounter post-event misinformation (PEM) about a crime then they can 
incorporate this misinformation into their subsequent descriptions of it (see Davis & Loftus, 2007). 
The present studies focus on PEM deriving from a co-witness. This is important as most crimes 
have multiple eyewitnesses (Paterson & Kemp, 2006a; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008) and PEM can 
be transferred between these eyewitnesses ‘directly’ during conversations about the crime or 
‘indirectly’ through a third party, such as a police officer, who informs one eyewitness about what a 
co-witness has said (Luus & Wells, 1994). Co-witness PEM is a concern for legal professionals as 
there are several documented criminal cases where direct and indirect exposure to it has 
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contaminated an eyewitness’s subsequent legal testimony and compromised a police investigation 
(see Gabbert, Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & Jamieson, 2012; Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & 
Gabbert, 2009). When one individual alters their memory report of an event to be consistent with 
another’s differing memory report of the same event, this is known as memory conformity (Wright, 
Self, & Justice, 2000) or social contagion of memory (Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001). 
Researchers have developed a number of techniques to induce memory conformity in the 
laboratory. Modelling real life scenarios, participants in these studies can be exposed to co-
participant PEM directly or indirectly (see Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004; Meade & 
Roediger, 2002, for examples of both). A popular method of direct exposure involves having 
participant and confederate pairs study and remember the same information together. During the 
collaborative remembering test, the confederate deliberately introduces PEM. On subsequent 
individual testing, participants succumb to memory conformity by including the PEM in their 
memory reports. A popular method of indirect exposure is to have individual participants study 
some information, then have them read or listen to a hypothetical co-participant’s erroneous recall 
of this same information, and then have them complete an individual memory test. Again, 
participants succumb to memory conformity and incorporate the PEM into their memory reports. 
Several studies have also examined whether directly or indirectly encountered co-witness PEM 
produces stronger memory conformity effects and no differences are typically observed (e.g., Blank 
et al., 2013; Meade & Roediger, 2002; Paterson & Kemp, 2006b, but see Gabbert et al., 2004). 
Wright et al. (2009) suggest memory conformity occurs for one of three reasons. First, it can 
occur as a result of normative influence, whereby a participant privately knows that the PEM is 
inaccurate but includes it in a memory report out of a desire to avoid any potential conflict with the 
source. Second, it can occur as a result of informational influence, whereby a participant is unsure if 
the PEM is accurate but reports it anyway out of a desire to be correct. Third, it can occur as a result 
of false remembering, whereby a participant forms an episodic memory of the PEM and genuinely 
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believes it is accurate. Individual participants within the same study may succumb to memory 
conformity for different reasons (e.g., Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2007; Meade & Roediger, 2002). 
Taking inspiration from the memory conformity literature, Thorley (2015) recently 
examined whether or not exposing an eyewitness to a co-witness statement that incorrectly blames 
an innocent bystander for a crime can increase the likelihood of the eyewitness subsequently 
blaming the innocent bystander for the crime. In that study, nearly 43% of participants who read 
such a statement from a young female co-witness also blamed the innocent bystander. In 
comparison, fewer than 8% of participants who read a correct statement or a control statement 
(where no blame was mentioned) from this same co-witness blamed the innocent bystander. 
Participants’ attributions of blame can therefore be influenced by PEM deriving from a co-witness 
(see also Thorley & Rushton-Woods, 2013). This specific type of memory conformity is called 
blame conformity and is the focus of present studies. As both effects are conceptually similar, they 
likely have similar underlying causes. Blame conformity is important as it could result in the police 
wrongfully arresting an innocent bystander for a crime and that could either slow down an 
investigation or, in extreme cases, result in an erroneous conviction. 
Co-witness confidence and memory conformity 
Eyewitnesses can display high levels of confidence in the PEM they claim to remember (e.g., 
Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Luna & Migueles, 
2009). Moreover, people perceive highly confident eyewitnesses as more accurate than less 
confident eyewitnesses (see Penrod & Cutler, 1995) and more readily believe the testimony of a 
very confident but inaccurate eyewitness over that of a less confident but more accurate eyewitness 
(e.g., Brewer & Burke, 2002; Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981). Thus, if a co-witness expresses a 
high degree of confidence in the accuracy of his or her errors when describing a crime, an 
eyewitness may believe this PEM is accurate and incorporate it into his or her own subsequent 
memory report of the crime. 
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Goodwin, Kukucka, and Hawks (2013) have examined whether or not a co-witness’s 
confidence in his or her recall errors influences memory conformity. In their study, participant and 
confederate pairs watched a crime video and then took turns answering questions about it, with both 
providing answers to the same question aloud before moving on to the next question. The 
confederate responded first for half of the questions and made six deliberate recall errors. 
Confidence ratings of 1 (low confidence) to 10 (high confidence) were also provided for each 
answer. Half of the participants worked with a confederate who expressed low confidence in the 
PEM (2’s or 3’s on the confidence scale) and half worked with a confederate who expressed high 
confidence in the PEM (8’s or 9’s). Participants were more likely to engage in memory conformity 
with the high confidence confederate by repeating this person’s incorrect answers (see also Ost, 
Ghonouie, Cook, & Vrij, 2008, and Wright et al., 2000). Participants’ confidence in these incorrect 
answers also mirrored those of the confederate, suggesting a confidence conformity effect. 
Surprisingly, Goodwin et al. (2013) also found little evidence of memory conformity (and, 
therefore, confidence conformity) when participants completed a post-collaborative individual 
memory test. Goodwin et al. suggest that participants primarily engaged in memory conformity and 
confidence conformity during collaboration as a result of normative influence. These effects then 
disappeared on the subsequent individual memory test as participants recalled in private and were 
no longer concerned about disagreeing with the confederate. The complete elimination of memory 
conformity on subsequent individual tests is, however, unusual. In many memory conformity 
studies, participants continue conforming when tested alone (see Gabbert et al., 2012; Wright et al., 
2009). Re-examining the impact of co-witness confidence on memory conformity when participants 
are tested alone would therefore be beneficial in case Goodwin et al.’s null effects were peculiar to 
their study. 
Eyewitness self-confidence and memory conformity 
Self-confidence is typically decomposed into general self-confidence and specific self-
confidence (see Oney & Oksuzoglu-Guven, 2015, for a detailed overview). General self-confidence 
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is the extent to which a person believes in their own overall abilities irrespective of any specific 
context. Specific self-confidence is a person's confidence in a specific ability in a specific domain at 
a given point of time. Both types of self-confidence are related in the sense that general self-
confidence is an aggregate of specific self-confidences. General self-confidence, however, is fairly 
stable over time whereas specific self-confidence is unstable as it is based on task-specific 
experiences and is updated each time the specific task is completed. Consequently, general self-
confidence is seen as a personality trait and specific self-confidence as a personality state. The 
present research focusses on general self-confidence only. 
To date, only one memory study has attempted to directly measure the impact of self-
confidence on susceptibility to PEM. In that study, Vrij and Bush (2000) assessed younger (5-6 year 
olds) and older (10-11 year olds) children’s self-confidence, presented them with a cartoon, and 
then had them answer a series of factual and misleading questions (i.e., questions relating to events 
that did not take place) about the cartoon. It was found that the more self-confident the children 
were, the fewer inaccurate answers they gave to the misleading questions. Unfortunately, self-
confidence was not assessed using a validated measure in that study (see p.134), with the authors 
using six items from a self-esteem questionnaire that they state “in our view indicate self-confidence” 
(p.131). This study therefore provides some tentative evidence to suggest self-confidence may 
impact upon susceptibility to memory conformity/blame conformity but a more direct investigation 
of this issue is needed. 
The current studies 
Across two studies, we will examine the impact of co-witness confidence and own self-
confidence on susceptibility to blame conformity. In both, participant eyewitnesses will watch a 
crime video and then read a co-witness statement that correctly blames the perpetrator for the crime, 
incorrectly blames an innocent bystander, or blames nobody. Participants will then indicate who 
they believe committed the crime. In Study 1, the co-witness will express either high or low 
confidence in her statement. In Study 2, the co-witness statement will contain no expression of 
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confidence and, instead, participants own levels of general self-confidence will be assessed. In both 
studies, participants will also rate their own confidence in their blame judgements.  
Study 1 is a conceptual re-examination of Goodwin et al.’s (2013) observation that co-
witness confidence has no impact upon the degree to which participant eyewitnesses engage in 
memory conformity when tested alone. As mentioned, Goodwin et al. found no evidence of this, but 
they also found no evidence of any memory conformity when participants were tested alone. Such a 
finding is unusual. We will therefore re-examine this issue using the (conceptually similar) blame 
conformity paradigm. Study 2 is the first to examine whether or not general self-confidence, as 
assessed by a validated self-confidence questionnaire, can predict whether or not a person engages 
in memory conformity/blame conformity. This study could therefore make a theoretical 
contribution to the literature by identifying a previously unidentified mechanism that moderates 
memory conformity/blame conformity. 
Several hypotheses can be proposed for both studies. For Study 1, it is anticipated that 
participants will be more likely to engage in blame conformity with a high confidence co-witness 
than a low confidence co-witness. This is based upon past observations that participants are more 
likely to engage in memory conformity with a high confidence co-witness than a less confident one 
(Goodwin et al., 2013; Ost et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2000) and that memory conformity/blame 
conformity effects occur when participants are tested alone (see Gabbert et al., 2012; Thorley, 2015; 
Wright et al., 2009). This prediction, however, is tentative as memory conformity effects did not 
occur in Goodwin et al.’s (2013) study when participants were tested alone. It is also anticipated 
that participants who engage in blame conformity with a high confidence co-witness will have more 
confidence in their blame judgements than those who engage in blame conformity with a low 
confidence co-witness. This is based upon the Goodwin et al.’s observation that participants engage 
in confidence conformity. 
For Study 2, it is tentatively expected that participants higher in general self-confidence will 
be less susceptible to blame conformity. This is based upon past research showing that children 
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higher in self-confidence are less likely to answer misleading questions incorrectly (Vrij & Bush, 
2000). Finally, it is unclear as to whether or not participants’ own general self-confidence will be 
associated with their confidence in their blame judgements. This issue has not previously been 
examined and is exploratory. 
Study 1 
Study 1 examined whether or not participant eyewitnesses are at increased risk of blaming 
an innocent bystander for a crime after reading an incorrect statement from a co-witness who 
expresses with a high degree of confidence, compared to a low degree of confidence, that the 
innocent bystander was the perpetrator. 
Method 
Participants 
There were 288 participants, aged 19-67 (M = 34.15, SD = 10.14; 55% male, 45% female). 
They were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, which is an online labour market where 
participants complete tasks for pay (see Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; Paolacci & Chandler, 
2014). All were located in the United States, spoke fluent English, had completed at least 1000 
previous tasks, and had a 95% or greater approval rating for these tasks. All were paid US$2. 
Design 
There was a 3 x 2 between-subjects design with 48 participants in each condition. The first 
independent variable was co-witness statement type. This varied according to whether the co-
witness blamed no one for the crime (a control statement), correctly blamed the perpetrator for the 
crime, or incorrectly blamed an innocent bystander for the crime. The second independent variable 
was the co-witness’s level of confidence in the accuracy of the statement. For this, the co-witness 
expressed high confidence or low confidence. The dependent variables in this study were the 
participants’ attributions of blame for the crime and their confidence in these attributions. Both 
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Stimuli 
Study 1 utilised a crime video, two filler videos, a co-witness statement about the crime, a 
10-item recognition memory test about the crime, and a co-witness confidence manipulation check 
question. Each is now described in turn. 
 The crime video depicts a young female entering a park and sitting down on a bench. Once 
seated, she places her bag on the bench, removes a book from it, and begins to read. As she is 
reading, two young men can be seen sat nearby on separate benches. One is wearing a light blue 
polo shirt and is reading a book. The other is wearing a black and red polo shirt and is playing with 
his mobile phone. After a few moments, the female receives a phone call and paces around the park. 
As she does this, her bag is left unattended on the bench and she is facing away from it. The man in 
the black and red polo shirt notices this, walks over to the bag, picks it up, and walks out of the park. 
As this is happening, the man in the blue polo shirt is reading his book, unaware of the crime. When 
the student finishes her phone call, she turns to face the bench, notices her bag is gone, and looks 
around for it. The video lasts 1 min 49 sec. See Figure 1 for screenshots.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
The two 10 min filler videos were excerpts from the BBC television series Coast, which is a 
show about the British coastline. Their content does not overlap with the crime video.  
 The co-witness statement was preceded by a short paragraph containing orienting 
information. Specifically, participants were informed that “The bag theft you witnessed in the first 
video took place in a park at a university. You will next read an eyewitness statement that was 
provided to the campus security about the bag theft. The eyewitness is a female student at the 
university who was in the park at the time of the crime but who was sat out of view in the video”. 
The statement was written in the form of an interview between the security guard and the co-
witness. There were six versions of the statement. In each, the co-witness provided an identical, and 
accurate, physical description of the victim and the two men in the park, the actions of the victim 
throughout the video, and the actions of the two men up until the point of the theft. These six 
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statements only differed with regards to who the co-witness blamed for the crime and how 
confident she was in the accuracy of her statement. 
Two of the co-witness’s statements provided a correct account of the theft, accurately stating 
“the man in the black and red polo shirt” stole the bag. There were also two incorrect statements, 
incorrectly stating “the man in the light blue polo shirt” stole the bag. Finally, two of the co-witness 
statements were control statements that stated “one of the men” stole the bag but did not indicate 
which. The control statements are important as they provide a measure of how accurately 
participants remembered who was to blame for the crime in the absence of any (erroneous or correct) 
co-witness influence. Towards the end of each statement, the security guard asked the co-witness “If 
I were to ask you on a scale of 1-10 how confident you are in your description of the crime, what 
would you say?”. In one of the correct statements, incorrect statements, and control statements, she 
responded “Eight. I am very confident”. In the remaining three statements, she responded “Two. I 
am not very confident”. 
The 10-item recognition memory test contained nine general questions related to different 
aspects of the crime video such as the colour of the gates in the park. None of these general 
questions related to the theft. These general questions were included to disguise the fact that the 
study was interested in attributions of blame for the crime and responses to them were not analysed1. 
The tenth question was the critical blame question. Specifically, participants were asked “Who stole 
the bag from the victim?”. Each question had four possible response options, one of which was 
always ‘don’t know’. The remaining response options for the critical question were “The man in the 
light blue polo shirt”, “The man in the red and black polo shirt”, and “neither man”. After 
answering each question, participants rated on a scale of 0-10 how confident they were in their 
answer (zero indicated no confidence and 10 indicated certainty). 
A co-witness confidence manipulation check question was also included at the end of the 
study to ensure participants paid attention to the co-witness’s confidence in her statement. 
Specifically, participants were asked “When interviewed by the campus security, how confident was 
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the eyewitness in her statement on a scale of 1 - 10?”. The response options were “2 out of 10”, “5 
out of 10”, “8 out of 10” or “don’t know”. If participants failed to answer this question correctly 
their results were excluded from all analyses. 
Procedure 
Testing occurred in one online session lasting approximately 30 mins. First, onscreen 
instructions informed participants that they would be required to watch three short videos and that 
their enjoyment of these videos would be assessed. No mention was made of any memory tests. All 
participants were then asked to don headphones and the crime video was shown. When the crime 
video finished, a second (filler) video was shown. After the filler video, participants read the 
orienting information about the eyewitness statement and had a fixed period of 2 min to read the 
statement. After this, the statement disappeared and participants were informed that they would 
watch another (filler) video. After this video, onscreen instructions informed participants that they 
would be required to answer questions about the crime video. The first of the 10-item multiple 
choice questions then appeared. Each question was presented separately and, immediately after each 
question, participants rated their confidence in their answer. During this test, the critical question 
always appeared eighth. After answering all 10 questions, participants were asked the manipulation 
check question. The study then ended. 
Results and Discussion 
Co-witness confidence manipulation check 
Overall, 94% of participants answered this question correctly. Those participants who 
answered this question incorrectly or responded “don’t know” were excluded from all further 
analyses. After exclusion, there were 48 participants in the high confidence control statement 
condition, 46 in the high confidence correct statement condition, 44 in the high confidence incorrect 
statement condition, 45 in the low confidence control statement condition, 44 in the low confidence 
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Blame conformity analyses 
Two 4 x 3 Exact Pearson Chi-Square tests were used to ascertain if there was an association 
between who participants blamed for the crime (the innocent bystander, the perpetrator, neither, or 
don’t know) and who the co-witness blamed for the crime (the innocent bystander, the perpetrator, 
or nobody). The first test examined the attributions of blame of those participants who read the high 
confidence co-witness statement and second examined attributions of blame of those participants 
who read the low confidence co-witness statement. Exact Chi-Square tests were used as data 
screening revealed several contingency table cells had expected counts of less than 5 (for readers 
unfamiliar with Exact tests, see Mehta & Patel, 2011). The full range of observed frequencies (as 
percentages) can be seen in Table 1. 
After reading the control statement from the high confidence co-witness, 8.33% of 
participants blamed the innocent bystander for the crime whereas 83.33% blamed the perpetrator. A 
similar trend was observed after participants read the correct statement from the high confidence co-
witness, with 2.17% blaming the innocent bystander and 97.83% blaming the perpetrator.  
Participants were therefore largely correct in their attribution of blame in these conditions. In 
contrast, when participants read the incorrect high confidence co-witness statement, 34.09% blamed 
the innocent bystander whereas 59.09% blamed the perpetrator. This latter result implies blame 
conformity occurred. In line with this, there was a significant association between who the high 
confidence co-witness blamed for the crime and who participants blamed, χ2 (6, n = 138) = 31.11, 
Exact p = .001, Cramer’s V = .34. The standardised residuals were examined to determine which 
cells contained frequencies that differed from those expected if there was no association between 
who the co-witness blamed and who participants blamed (for readers unfamiliar with standardised 
residuals, see Field, 2013). To be statistically significant at the .05 alpha level, the standardised 
residuals need to be greater than 1.96 z-scores. After reading an incorrect high confidence co-
witness statement, participants blamed the innocent bystander more often than expected (z = 3.40). 
This confirms that participants engaged in blame conformity in this condition. After reading the 
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high confidence co-witness correct statement, fewer participants than expected blamed the innocent 
bystander (z = 2.20). This latter result occurred as fewer participants in this condition blamed the 
innocent bystander for the crime than those who read the control statement and the incorrect 
statement. No other cells contained values that significantly differed from the expected frequencies 
(all z’s = <1.96). 
After reading the control statement from the low confidence co-witness, 6.67% of 
participants blamed the innocent bystander for the crime and 82.22% blamed the perpetrator. A 
similar trend was observed after participants read the correct statement from the low confidence co-
witness, with 6.82% blaming the innocent bystander and 86.36% blaming the perpetrator.  
Participants were therefore, once again, largely accurate in their attribution of blame in these 
conditions. In contrast, when participants read the incorrect low confidence co-witness statement, 
22.22% blamed the innocent bystander and 73.33% blamed the perpetrator. There was, therefore, a 
trend towards blame conformity. There was a borderline significant association between who the 
low confidence co-witness blamed for the crime and who participants blamed, χ2 (6, n = 134) = 
10.48, Exact p = .07, Cramer’s V = .20. As this analysis only approached significance, the 
standardised residuals were examined. After reading the incorrect low confidence co-witness 
statement, participants blamed the innocent bystander for the crime more often than expected (z = 
2.00). This result therefore suggests that participants engaged in blame conformity with the low 
confidence co-witness after reading her incorrect statement. No other cells contained values that 
significantly differed from the expected frequencies (all z’s = <1.96). 
Combined, these results demonstrate that participants engaged in blame conformity in this 
study. This effect, however, was larger when the co-witness expressed high confidence (Cramer’s V 
= .34), compared to low confidence (Cramer’s V = .20), in the accuracy of her incorrect statement.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Blame confidence analyses 
To examine for confidence conformity, the confidence ratings of the participants who 
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blamed the innocent bystander after reading the high and low confidence incorrect co-witness 
statements were compared using a between-subjects t-test. It was found participants who blamed the 
innocent bystander had equivalent levels of confidence in their judgements irrespective of whether 
they read a high confidence (M = 7.20, SD = 2.18) or low confidence (M = 6.60, SD = 2.72) co-
witness statement, t(23) = .61, p = .55, d = 0.24. An additional exploratory test was also conducted 
comparing the confidence of participants who blamed the innocent bystander and those who did not 
in the incorrect statement condition only, irrespective of whether they worked with a high or low 
confidence co-witness. It was found that those who blamed he innocent bystander had lower 
confidence in their judgements (M = 6.96, SD = 2.37) than those who did not (M = 9.15, SD = 1.74), 
t(82)= 4.72, p< 0.05, d = 1.05. Combined, these results offer no evidence of confidence conformity 
amongst those who engaged in blame conformity. They do, however, show that those who engaged 
in blame conformity after reading an incorrect statement were less confident in their blame 
judgements than those who did not engage in blame conformity after reading an incorrect statement. 
Study 2 
Study 2 examined whether or not eyewitnesses with higher general self-confidence, 
compared to those with lower general self-confidence, are at less risk of blaming an innocent 
bystander for a crime after reading an incorrect co-witness statement that suggests the innocent 
bystander was the perpetrator. 
Method 
Participants 
There were 240 participants, aged 18-78 (M = 36.67, SD = 10.88; 49.60% male, 50.40% 
female). They were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk using the same criteria as Study 1 and 
were paid US$2.50. 
Design 
This study had a 3 x 2 between-subjects design. The first factor was co-witness statement 
type (a control statement, a correct statement, or an incorrect statement). The second factor was the 
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participants’ level of general self-confidence as determined by their scores on the Personal 
Evaluation Inventory (PEI: Shrauger & Schohn, 1995). For this, the participants were classed as 
highest in general self-confidence if their scores were above the median and lowest in general self-
confidence if their scores were at or below the median. The PEI is described in the Stimuli section 
and the procedure for creating the median split is described in the Results section. As in Study 1, the 
dependent measures in this study were participants’ attributions of blame for the crime and their 
confidence in these attributions. 
Stimuli 
Study 2 utilised the same crime video, two filler videos, and 10-item recognition memory 
test about the crime video as Study 1. Novel to this study was the use of the PEI to assess 
participants’ levels of general self-confidence. The PEI is a 54 item self-report questionnaire with 
eight subscales. Six subscales are designed to assess college student’s specific self-confidence 
across six domains (e.g., physical appearance; speaking to groups). A seventh subscale assesses 
respondents’ current mood. Of most relevance here is the eighth subscale, which assesses 
respondents’ general self-confidence. The general self-confidence subscale can be used as a reliable 
measure of self-confidence in any population and not just college students (Stankov, Kleitman, & 
Jackson, 2014). As our sample in this study likely contained non-college students, only the results 
from general self-confidence subscale were analysed. This subscale contains seven items. Example 
items include "I have fewer doubts about my abilities than most people" and "If I were more 
confident about myself, my life would be better”. Each item on this subscale is rated on a 4-point 
Likert scale that ranges from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. Scores on the general self-
confidence subscale are summed across items, meaning that they range from 7 to 28. Higher scores 
indicate greater general self-confidence. The PEI has good reliability and validity (see Shrauger & 
Schohn, 1995; Stankov et al., 2014).  
The co-witness statement used in Study 2 was near identical to that from Study 1. The only 
difference was that the security guard did not ask the co-witness how confident she was in her 
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statement (and the co-witness offered no indication as to how confident she was). This meant that 
there were only three statement types in Study 2 (a control statement, a correct statement, and an 
incorrect statement). 
Results and Discussion 
Blame conformity analysis 
A median split of the general self-confidence sub-scale scores on the PEI was used as the 
basis for dividing participants into those with highest and lowest general self-confidence. The 
median value for participants’ scores on this scale was 17 (M = 17.35, SD = 4.65). Those who 
scored above the median (55.40% of the sample) were classed as having the highest self-confidence 
whereas those equal to or below median were classed as having the lowest self-confidence. We 
emphasise that we are not classifying the former as having high self-confidence and the latter as 
having low self-confidence as no cut-off points for such classifications exist. Instead, we are using 
the more conservative terms “highest self-confidence” and “lowest self-confidence” to reflect the 
fact that this division is being made arbitrarily. The final sample contained 35 participants in the 
highest self-confidence control statement condition, 39 in the highest self-confidence correct 
statement condition, 43 in the highest self-confidence incorrect statement condition, 45 in the 
lowest self-confidence control statement condition, 41 in the lowest self-confidence correct 
statement condition, and 37 in the lowest self-confidence incorrect statement condition. 
Two 4 x 3 Exact Pearson Chi-Square tests were conducted to ascertain if there was an 
association between who participants blamed for the crime (the innocent bystander, the perpetrator, 
neither, or don’t know) and who the co-witness blamed for the crime (nobody, the innocent 
bystander, the perpetrator). The first test examined attributions of blame of those participants with 
the highest self-confidence and second examined attributions of blame of those participants with the 
lowest self-confidence. The full range of observed frequencies (as percentages) are in Table 2. 
After reading the control co-witness statement, 8.60% of participants with highest self-
confidence blamed the innocent bystander for the crime whereas 85.70% blamed the perpetrator. 
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Similarly, after reading the correct co-witness statement, 5.10% of participants with the highest self-
confidence blamed the innocent bystander and 94.90% blamed the perpetrator. The participants 
with the highest self-confidence were therefore largely correct in their attributions of blame in these 
conditions. In contrast, when they read the incorrect co-witness statement, 16.30% of these 
participants blamed the innocent bystander and 81.40% blamed the perpetrator. There was therefore 
a general trend towards participants with the highest self-confidence engaging in blame conformity 
after reading an incorrect co-witness statement. Despite this, there was no significant association 
between who the co-witness blamed for the crime and who participants with the highest self-
confidence blamed, χ2 (6, n = 117) = 6.43, exact p = .38, Cramer’s V = .17. 
After reading the control co-witness statement, 4.44% of participants with lowest self-
confidence blamed the innocent bystander for the crime and 95.60% blamed the perpetrator. 
Similarly, after reading correct co-witness statement, 2.40% of participants with the lowest self-
confidence blamed the innocent bystander and 92.70% blamed the perpetrator. The participants 
with the lowest self-confidence were therefore largely correct in their attributions of blame in these 
conditions. In contrast, when they read the incorrect co-witness statement, 32.40% blamed the 
innocent bystander and 62.20% blamed the perpetrator. There was therefore a trend towards these 
participants engaging in blame conformity. In line with this, there was a significant association 
between who the co-witness blamed for the crime and who participants with the lowest self-
confidence blamed for the crime, χ2 (6, n = 123) = 25.43, exact p<.001, Cramer’s V = .32. The 
standardised residuals revealed that after reading an incorrect co-witness statement blaming the 
innocent bystander for the crime, those participants with the lowest self-confidence blamed the 
innocent bystander more often than expected (z = 3.50). No other cells contained values that 
significantly differed from the expected frequencies (all z’s = <1.96). 
One limitation of using a median split to divide participants into those with the highest and 
lowest general self-confidence is that those just above the median and those at or just below the 
median were categorised differently despite having similar levels of general self-confidence. To 
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ensure the effects of general self-confidence on blame conformity were not an artefact of this split, 
a binary logistic regression was conducted with general self-confidence scores as the predictor 
variable and blame (perpetrator or innocent bystander) as the outcome variable. After reading an 
incorrect co-witness statement, general self-confidence predicted blame χ2 (1, N = 77) = 7.51, 
p<.05, with the model explaining between 0.09% and 0.14% of the variance (Cox & Snell R2 and 
Nagelkerke R2, respectively). More specifically, increases in general self-confidence reduced the 
odds of blaming the innocent bystander for the crime (Exp(B) = .86).  
Combined, the above results demonstrate that participants with the lowest general self-
confidence were at greatest risk of engaging in blame conformity. Moreover, those with the highest 
general self-confidence (above the median) were at no greater risk of blaming the innocent 
bystander for the crime after reading an incorrect co-witness statement than those who read a 
correct or control co-witness statement. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Blame confidence analysis 
In an exploratory analysis, a Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation was used to test for a 
relationship between participants general self-confidence scores and their confidence in their 
incorrect blame judgements in the incorrect statement condition. No significant correlation was 
found, r = .04, n = 19, p = .85. To fully explore why this was the case, a 2 (general self-confidence: 
highest vs. lowest) x 2 (blame judgement: innocent bystander vs. perpetrator) between-subjects 
ANOVA was conducted. There was a main effect of blame judgment, with those who blamed the 
innocent bystander (M = 5.95, SD = 2.95) being less confident in their decision than those who 
blamed the perpetrator (M = 8.97, SD = 1.82), F(1, 73) = 31.53, MSe = 4.54, p<.001, ηp2 = .30. 
There was no significant main effect of general self-confidence and no significant interaction (both 
p’s>.05). These results show that participants who engaged in blame conformity after reading an 
incorrect co-witness statement were equally confident in their blame judgements irrespective of 
whether or not they had the highest or lowest general self-confidence. They were, however, also 
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less confident in their blame judgements than those who correctly blamed the perpetrator. 
General Discussion 
Memory conformity refers to the act of altering one’s account of an event to be consistent 
with another’s differing account of the same event. In two studies, we examined whether or not the 
degree to which participant eyewitnesses engage in a specific form of memory conformity known as 
blame conformity, whereby they blame an innocent bystander for a crime after reading an incorrect 
co-witness statement suggesting this person was the perpetrator, is influenced by the level of 
confidence the co-witness expresses in her incorrect statement (Study 1) and an eyewitness’s own 
level of general self-confidence (Study 2). Participants’ confidence levels in their blame judgements 
were also assessed. 
Co-witness confidence 
It was previously known that participants are more likely to engage in memory conformity 
with a confederate during a collaborative remembering task when the confederate expresses a high 
level of confidence, compared to a low level of confidence, in his or her inaccurate recollections 
(Goodwin et al., 2013; Ost et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2000). Goodwin et al., however, also found 
little evidence of memory conformity, irrespective of co-witness confidence, when participants 
were subsequently tested alone. This latter finding is unusual as memory conformity typically 
occurs when participants are tested alone (see Gabbert et al., 2012; Wright et al., 2009). Blame 
conformity also occurs when participants are tested alone (Thorley, 2015, Thorley & Rushton-
Woods, 2013). Study 1 therefore re-examined the impact of an inaccurate co-witness’s confidence 
on participants’ memory reports of events when they are tested alone (using a blame conformity 
paradigm) in case the lack of memory conformity observed by Goodwin et al. was peculiar to their 
study. We found that blame conformity did occur when participants were tested alone. This 
occurred irrespective of the inaccurate co-witness’s confidence, though the effect was larger when 
participants were exposed to a highly confident co-witness. 
Goodwin et al. (2013) also found that participants’ confidence levels during their 
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collaborative remembering test mirrored those of the confederate, suggesting a confidence 
conformity effect. Unsurprisingly, they found no such effect when participants were tested alone (as 
no memory conformity was observed). In our Study 1, participants who engaged in blame 
conformity with the incorrect co-witness, irrespective of how confident the co-witness was, had 
moderate levels of confidence in their blame judgements. Moreover, they were significantly less 
confident than those who did not engage in blame conformity. 
It is likely our findings conflict with those of Goodwin et al. (2013) as participants in both 
studies engaged in memory conformity/blame conformity for different reasons. Goodwin et al. 
suggest their participants engaged in memory conformity and confidence conformity during their 
collaborative remembering task as a result of normative influence, meaning that they knew the 
confederate was wrong but conformed in order to avoid a disagreement. This effect then 
disappeared on the post-collaborative individual memory test when there was no opportunity for 
disagreement. It is unlikely our participants engaged in blame conformity as a result of normative 
influence as they always worked alone and there was no confederate to disagree with. It seems more 
likely that participants in Study 1 engaged in blame conformity as a result of informational 
influence, whereby they were unsure if the incorrect co-witness statement was correct but 
conformed anyway in case it was. When the co-witness was not very confident, the participants 
may have felt more comfortable dismissing her PEM as potentially incorrect and blaming the 
perpetrator. When the co-witness very confident, however, the participants may have felt more 
inclined to trust her PEM and blame the innocent bystander. Support for this suggestion comes from 
earlier work showing that people perceive highly confident eyewitnesses as more accurate than less 
confident eyewitnesses (see Penrod & Cutler, 1995) and they trust the testimony of very confident 
but inaccurate eyewitnesses over that of less confident but more accurate eyewitnesses (Brewer & 
Burke, 2002; Lindsey et al., 1981). An informational influence explanation is also supported by our 
observation that participants who engaged in blame conformity had less confidence in their blame 
attributions than those who did not, suggesting that they had doubts over whether or not the 
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incorrect co-witness statement was correct but blamed the innocent bystander for the crime anyway. 
It is important to acknowledge that not all participants who engaged in blame conformity 
may have done so as a result of informational influence. We cannot rule out the possibility that 
some engaged in blame conformity as they developed false memories of the innocent bystander 
committing the crime. Memory conformity can occur as a result of both informational influence and 
false remembering within the same study (Gabbert et al., 2007; Meade & Roediger, 2002). Future 
research establishing the rate of false remembering (if any occurs) would be beneficial.  
Eyewitness self-confidence 
Prior to Study 2, little was known about the impact of eyewitnesses own general self-
confidence on their susceptibility to memory conformity/blame conformity. Vrij and Bush (2000) 
had previously shown that children with higher self-confidence are less likely to answer misleading 
questions inaccurately, although self-confidence was not assessed in their study using a validated 
measure. Study 2 extends their finding by showing that adults who are highest in general self-
confidence, as assessed using a validated measure, are less likely to engage in blame conformity 
than those who are lowest in general self-confidence. It may be the case that individuals higher in 
general self-confidence have more self-belief in their own memory and are less likely to engage in 
memory conformity/blame conformity with a source when they are unsure of its accuracy. From a 
theoretical perspective, this finding is important as it identifies a previously unidentified moderator 
of memory conformity/blame conformity.  
Those participants who engaged in blame conformity were equivalent in terms of the 
confidence they expressed in their incorrect blame judgements, irrespective of how much self-
confidence they had. As in Study 1, however, these participants were less confident in their 
judgements than those who did not engage in blame conformity after reading an incorrect co-
witness statement. This suggests that they did not fully trust the co-witness statement but they 
conformed regardless. Again, this is consistent with an informational influence explanation for the 
blame conformity observed here (but we cannot rule out the possibility that some participants had 
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false memories of the innocent bystander committing the crime). 
Limitations 
One limitation to the ecological validity of these studies is the way in which memory of the 
perpetrator was assessed. Here, participants answered a multiple choice recognition test question 
about who committed the crime. This test was used to ensure each participant was questioned about 
the perpetrator’s identity in an identical way. Real police interviewers, however, are unlikely to ask 
eyewitnesses multiple choice questions. Instead, guidelines in many countries recommend they first 
ask eyewitnesses to freely the recall a crime and then ask them specific cued recall questions about 
it (e.g., for the United States, see National Institute of Justice, 1999, 2002; for the United Kingdom, 
see Ministry of Justice, 2011). Free recall typically produces accurate recollection as it requires self-
guided retrieval, meaning eyewitnesses only report information they are confident about (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1994, 1996). In contrast, multiple choice tests utilise externally-guided retrieval where 
the interviewer decides which information the eyewitness needs to remember. Externally-guided 
retrieval can increase recollection errors and confabulations as eyewitnesses are forced to try and 
remember information they may be unsure of. It is possible that asking our participants a multiple 
choice question about who committed the crime, when one option was the innocent bystander, 
facilitated blame conformity so that it reached levels that would not have been observed during a 
free recall test. To control for this, one of the response options to the multiple choice questions in 
both studies was ‘don’t know’. This is forensically important as real eyewitnesses can refrain from 
answering a question during an interview if they are unsure of the answer (Roebers & Fernandez, 
2002). It is also methodologically important as providing this option during multiple choice 
recognition tests increases memory accuracy (e.g., Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003; Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1994, 1996; Scoboria, Mazzoni, & Kirsch, 2008). Thus, whilst the ecological validity of this study 
may have been lowered by using a multiple choice question to assess memory of the perpetrator, it 
is unlikely that this question increased susceptibility to blame conformity. 
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It is also acknowledged that the generalisability of the blame conformity effect may be 
limited to instances where there is a degree of similarity between the innocent bystander and the 
perpetrator. Eyewitnesses are more likely to spontaneously blame an innocent bystander for a crime 
if this person resembles the perpetrator (Read, Tollestrup, Hammersley, McFadzen, & Christensen, 
1990). In the current studies, blame for an incident was shifted between two people who were 
similar in terms of their gender, race, and age. It may be case that these ethnographic similarities 
facilitated blame conformity as participants felt they may have simply misremembered which young 
white male committed the crime. There were, however, several differences between the perpetrator 
and innocent bystander such as their clothing, hairstyle, and build. Several other salient differences, 
such as their gender or race, could have also existed between them. It would be of interest to 
determine whether or not blame conformity still occurs when more salient differences exist between 
an innocent bystander and a perpetrator. 
Conclusion 
The current studies showed that participants are at risk of blaming an innocent bystander for 
a crime after reading an incorrect co-witness statement blaming this person for the crime. Moreover, 
this effect is greater when the co-witness expresses a high level of confidence, compared to a low 
level of confidence, in the accuracy of her incorrect statement, and when participants are low, 
compared to high, in general self-confidence. Participants who blame an innocent bystander are also 
less confident in their decisions that those who do not blame an innocent bystander, suggesting an 
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Figure 1. Three screenshots from the crime video. The top pane shows the female victim entering 
the park, the middle pane shows the victim sat on a bench reading a book whilst the innocent 
bystander (furthest left) and perpetrator are sat nearby, and the bottom pane shows the victim using 
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Table 1 
Percentage of trials on which participants placed blame for a crime onto the perpetrator, innocent 
bystander, neither person, or responded don’t know after reading a co-witness statement where a 
high-confidence or low-confidence co-witness blamed the perpetrator, blamed the innocent 
bystander, or blamed no-one (control). The percentages shown are within-statement type. 
Confidence Statement Type Participant Blame 








Low Correct 86.36 6.82 2.27 4.54 
 Incorrect 73.33 22.22 0.00 4.44 
 Control 82.22 6.67 0.00 11.11 
High Correct 97.83 2.17 0.00 0.00 
 Incorrect 59.09 34.09 4.54 2.27 
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Table 2 
Percentage of trials on which participants who were lowest or highest in general self-confidence 
placed blame for a crime onto the perpetrator, innocent bystander, neither person, or responded 
don’t know after reading a statement about the crime from a co-witness who blamed the 
perpetrator, blamed the innocent bystander, or blamed no-one (control). The percentages shown 
are within-statement type. 
Confidence Statement Type Participant Blame 








Low Correct 92.70 2.40 0.00 4.90 
 Incorrect 62.20 32.40 2.70 2.70 
 Control 95.60 4.40 0.00 0.00 
High Correct 94.90 5.10 0.00 0.00 
 Incorrect 81.40 16.30 0.00 2.30 
 Control* 85.70 8.60 2.90 2.90 
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Footnote 
1 Previous studies have found no evidence of a relationship between memory ability when 
recollecting information and susceptibility to memory conformity/blame conformity in relation to 
that same information (e.g., Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Thorley, 2013, Thorley & Rushton-
Woods, 2013). 
